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"Why
James Joyce Was Accepted and I Was Not":
Modernist Fiction and Gertrude Stein's Narrative
by Marianne DeKoven
Gertrude Stein defines
the limits of modernism by transgressing them, particularly in her prose
narrative. Though she was contemporaneous with modernism, and helped to
engender it in Three Lives, and though there are many points of
intersection between her work and modernism, particularly in her poetics,
her work is eccentric to the mainstream of modernism. A comparison of
her work to fiction that is indisputably modernist makes this liminality
apparent, and in doing so reveals as much about what modernism is as about
what, in Stein, it is not.
In December,
1991, I presented a version of this essay at the MLA meeting of the James
Joyce Society, a panel entitled "Joyce, Stein, Woolf, Richardson." My
first association with that panel title had been the Sesame Street jingle,
"one of these is not like the others, one of these just doesn't belong,
can you guess which one is not like the others by the time we finish this
song." On a number of counts, Gertrude Stein is the one that just doesn't
belong, and the fact that her name is not associated with the term stream-of-consciousness
may be the least interesting of those counts.
Different as
Joyce, Woolf and Richardson are, the simple statement can be made that
they are all modernist novelists. In engendering modernism, in their early
works, they rewrote the rules for fiction. Joyce, in Ulysses and
especially Finnegans Wake, and to a lesser extent Woolf in The
Waves, went on to push the novel to and perhaps beyond its limits.
But they still, deeply and meaningfully, worked in relation to the history
of the novel, including the history which both of them, and Richardson
as well, had already remade. Throughout her various phases of narrative
writing, Stein was responding to a different set of concerns.
In an interview
she gave near the end of her life, Stein said "You see it is the people
who generally smell of the museums who are accepted, and it is the new
who are not accepted. You have got to accept a complete difference. It
is hard to accept that, it is much easier to have one hand in the past.
That is why James Joyce was accepted and I was not. He leaned toward the
past, in my work the newness and difference is fundamental" (Transatlantic
Interview 29). "The smell of the museums" is at least in part the
smell of sour grapes, and postmodernism has deconstructed Stein's simple
modernist valorization of "newness" and "difference." Those qualifications
aside, however, and reading Stein somewhat against the grain, the issues
of "past" and "present" are crucial to understanding the distinction I
want to make between Joyce's, Woolf's or Richardson's modernist fiction
and Stein's experimentalist, avant-garde narrative.
Stein called
a number of her works "novels" (A Novel of Thank You is an even
more radically experimental text than The Making of Americans,
whose subtitle is A Novel) and even wrote some of them according
to the conventions for prose fiction--lines unbroken, consecutively numbered
chapters, named, described characters who act and speak. But her constructions
of narrative time, particularly her attempt to banish "memory" and to
articulate a "continuous present," where writing recreates itself anew
in each successive moment, made impossible the persistence through time
of a single universe of fictional material, however vast, diverse, and
shifting; a persistence upon which the novel depends.
In discussing
her attempt to write in the continuous present, Stein says "the making
of a portrait of any one is as they are existing and as they are existing
has nothing to do with remembering any one or anything" ("Portraits and
Repetition" 175). Her writing must always be in the presentshe must
write in each moment what she knows without allowing herself to remember
what she knew. She rejects the mimetic art of remembering, of the reproducible
and continuous, of knowledge that is converted into an artifact of itself.
Remembering invokes what Stein considers the nineteenth-century English
linear mode of successivity; she calls it elsewhere "beginning middle
and ending," and considers herself to have replaced it with the twentieth-century
American mode of simultaneity, a thing not accreted through time but composed
instantaneously of its various, interchangeable, equally important parts.
Stein's response
to the actual impossibility of banishing memory, of writing or living
in this idealist construction of a pure present, is to compare her work
to film, the twentieth-century genre par excellence. She says "Funnily
enough the cinema has offered a solution of this thing. By a continuously
moving picture of any one there is no memory of any other thing and there
is that thing existing" ("Portraits and Repetition" 176). Ironically,
film can be used to make just the opposite case: that "continuously moving
picture" depends entirely on memory and on successivity through diachronic
time for the impression of continuous movement that gives Stein the sense
of an absolute present and the abolition of memory. But the film analogy
can also be used to support Stein's argument in a crucial way, a way that
points to a radical difference between her narrative and the fiction of
Joyce, Woolf or Richardson.
The essay from
which I have been quoting, one of the Lectures in America called
"Portraits and Repetition," contains Stein's most useful discussion of
her particular deployment of a type of repetition she calls insistence.
The use of repetition in the service of a continuous present is a characteristic
Steinian paradox. Repetition would seem to depend utterly on memory. To
repeat is precisely to reproduce the past in the present. But Stein's
argument implies that it's the avoidance of repetition that links the
present to the past, through denial, or, as in the adage "those who forget
history are condemned to repeat it," through memory. A work that moves
successively through linear time changes in relation to its own past.
But the kind of steadily shifting repetition Stein calls insistence, that
reinvents itself anew in each moment of narrative, is unaware of its past
and therefore free to repeat it. Insistence is never verbatim repetition,
rather it's a function of looking at the same thing in a different present
moment, in which, if it is alive, the thing looked at has minutely changed.
The useful film
analogy is not to the overall impact of "no memory of any other thing"
that Stein describes in "Portraits and Repetition," but to the film strip
itself, in which each frame largely repeats but slightly shifts the frame
before it. Each frame is a new picture shot in the present moment, and
therefore it is different from the one before because each present moment
is different from the one before, but, when the camera has remained focused
on the same thing, each frame largely repeats the one before. So, repetition,
which seems to presuppose memory, can in fact negate it. In the Steinian
continuous present, the shifting repetition of insistence is inevitable
because you rediscover and reinvent in each moment what you know. If you
knew you'd already known it you wouldn't have to say it again.
The purest form
of Steinian insistence comes in the narrative writing she did between
1906 and 1912, or Three Lives and Tender Buttons, a six
year period in which she wrote shorter, longer, and much longer narratives,
including The Making of Americans, Matisse, Picasso and
Gertrude Stein otherwise known as GMP, A Long Gay Book,
and Many Many Women. Stein's style changed radically during the
course of this period, from the style I call insistence to what became
the style of Tender Buttons, the style I call lively words. Lively
words is as different from insistence as two kinds of writing by the same
person can be. I can't think of another writer whose work diverged so
drastically and totally from its own past in such a short time. The best
analogy that comes to mind is, not surprisingly, the difference between
Picasso's blue period and his so-called heroic cubism. This stylistic
shift happens for Stein within several of her long 1909-1912 narratives,
so that the end of GMP or A Long Gay Book is entirely unrecognizable
to its beginning. A Long Gay Book, for example, begins in characteristic
insistence:
When they
are very little just only a baby you can never tell which one is to
be a lady.
There are
some when they feel it inside them that it has been with them that
there was once so very little of them, that they were a baby, helpless
and no conscious feeling in them, that they knew nothing then when
they were kissed and dandled and fixed by others who knew them when
they could know nothing inside them or around them, some get from
all this that once surely happened to them to that which was then
every bit that was then them, there are some when they feel it later
inside them that they were such once and that was all that there was
then of them, there are some who have from such a knowing an uncertain
curious kind of feeling in them that their having been so little once
and knowing nothing makes it all a broken world for them that they
have inside them, kills for them the everlasting feeling; and they
spend their life in many ways, and always they are trying to make
for themselves a new everlasting feeling.(13)
The book ends in
pure lively words: "Lead kind in soap, lead kind in soap sew up. Lead
kind in so up. Lead kind in so up. Leaves a mass, so mean. No shows. Leaves
a mass cool will. Leaves a mass puddle. Etching. Etching a chief, none
plush" (116). All other obvious dissimilarities between both of these
styles and Joyce's or Woolf's aside, a more diametrical opposition to
the perfectly circular structure of Finnegans Wake or the implied
circular structure of The Waves I cannot imagine.
Ulysses
and Mrs. Dalloway are a day, The Waves is at once a day
and the duration of six lives that are also one life, Finnegans Wake
is a dream. None of Stein's soi-disant novels after Three Lives
has any such deep-structural cohesion, nor any of the other myriad forms
of artful cohesion Joyce and Woolf wove into their novels. The Making
of Americans is supposed to be the history of "everyone who is or
was or could be living," but most of it instead records Stein's alternation
between assertion of her intention to write that history and, increasingly
as the pages mount, despair at the impossibility of doing so. The narrative
is the record of its own failure to be written as a novel. But to say
that is in no way to condemn it, or even to judge it negatively, nor do
I intend to disparage Stein's narrative by contrasting it to Joyce's,
Woolf's or Richardson's. The pleasures of reading Stein are great, but
different.
Stein's narratives
of 1909-12 are the most extreme instances in her oeuvre of the narrative
discontinuity produced by the continuous present. In the late twenties,
she began to reintroduce certain modes of cohesion into her writing, and
the narratives she wrote in the thirties and forties are brought under
the rule of various kinds of organizing forces. Does the late Stein, then,
belong on the list with Joyce, Woolf and Richardson? Or, for an even stronger
case, the late Stein plus the very early Stein of Fernhurst, Q.E.D.
and Three Lives? No. Only Three Lives is a work of modernist
fiction, devoted like the work of Joyce, Woolf and Richardson to inventing
new fictional means to represent the processes of consciousness. Even
Three Lives, however, is so American, so much an eruption of modernism
from within Jamesian pragmatism and American naturalism, that it occupies
a different space within modernist fiction than that associated with the
other three.
With Steinian
narrative of the thirties and forties, despite its moves back toward narrative
conventionits adoption of modes of cohesion, particularly the recurring
motifwe are still in a different universe of writing. Even if we
ignore the issue of genre, which we would have to because most of Stein's
narrative work in this period, especially the most interesting work (for
example The Geographical History of America, and Lectures in
America itself), is not fiction at all but rather some form of extended
meditation, the narrative time in which Stein wrote was still a version
of the continuous present. Finnegans Wake, for all its limitless
plenitude, can be and has been outlined. The significance of this outline
for my argument here is not so much that it implies an ordered whole,
but that none of its constituent parts reproduce one another. Each chapter,
and each subsection within each chapter, opens up a new, different portion
of the fiction's universe. Even in the most apparently outlineable work
by Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, which is divided
into successive chronological chapters, subsectional summaries would be
forced to repeat one another. It is not that the chronological chapters
are nonfunctionalthe text does in fact roughly follow its announced
chronological ordering. But within each chapter, the text circles and
recircles, repeats and rerepeats, jumps ahead and jumps back in time,
moving with the associative movement of Stein's memory as she writes.
Again, the narrative fact most significant for both production and reception
of this text is the Steinian continuous present of writing, in which knowledge
is reinvented and rediscovered from moment to moment, not the chronological
time of the overall, in a significant way artificially superimposed, narrative
structure.
Even when discussing
the shift in the clientele at her famous Saturday evening salons, as they
became progressively more famous, for example, Stein undermines the chronological
progression as soon as she establishes it. She says "Everybody brought
somebody. As I said the character of the Saturday evenings was gradually
changing, that is to say, the kind of people who came had changed. Somebody
brought the Infanta Eulalia and brought her several times" (123). "As
I said" establishes the essential motif of repetition that dominates the
text. "Was gradually changing," implying steady progression, shifts within
one sentence to "had changed," an accomplished fact. This shift destabilizes
the distinction between the present of remembering and the past that is
remembered. "Everybody brought somebody" levels the sense of hierarchy
implied by increasing fame and by the Infanta Eulalia. The Infanta Eulalia
herself becomes a moment of repetition, as the "everybody" who "brought
somebody" is converted into the "somebody" who "brought the Infanta Eulalia
and brought her several times." Four paragraphs later, after a few more
famous names are mentioned (Lady Cunard and Nancy Cunard, Lady Ottoline
Morrell, "a roumanian princess"), this social ascent is definitively levelled,
and the diachronic time in which social ascent must live is effectively
annihilated: "It was an endless variety. And everybody came and no one
made any difference. Gertrude Stein sat peacefully in a chair and those
who could did the same, the rest stood. There were the friends who sat
around the stove and talked and there were the endless strangers who came
and went. My memory of it is very vivid" (123-4).
Finally, it is
the issue of memory that most powerfully differentiates Stein from the
other three, especially Joyce, and from the quintessential modernism they
represent. There is hardly anything that Joyce does not remember, and
memory itself is a crucial preoccupation for him, while a moment of vivid
memory for Stein, that presents itself to her as a memory, is unusual
enough to be remarked upon. Generally the past, to have reality to Stein,
exists as the present. There is no cultural or psychic past for her to
hold up to the present, to hold up the present, to be faithful or unfaithful
to, to be guided by, to reinvent, rediscover and transmogrify into art.
Modernism in fiction can be said to have memory, "la recherche du temps
perdu," as one of its raisons d'etre and central tropes. Stein's work
in narrative is defined by her repudiation of that trope. It is a commonplace
to label Stein a postmodernist before her time; in this respect, if we
follow Jameson's analysis of the postmodern as annihilation of history,
as subsumption of all history to an inescapable present, then Stein certainly
qualifies.
But let me not
seem disingenuously to ignore the James Joyce Society's obvious reason
for including Stein on its panel's list of names. Most people would look
at that list and think not of Sesame Street but of a great man and three
great contemporaneous women. Or if they did see the list within the grid
that jingle enacts, perhaps then it would be Joyce who didn't belong.
Or the other three. There are many ways of aligning Stein, Woolf and Richardson
according to gender and distinguishing them from Joyce. One way would
be a modified version of the argument I have been making about Stein's
difference from the three modernist novelists. While Woolf and Richardson
wrote very much in and of the passage of time, and not in any sort of
continuous present, neither of them felt the need, pull or support of
a legitimating, authorizing, or threatening connection to any officially
sanctioned version of cultural history. This is precisely where accounts
of modernism based primarily on works by men, and uninformed by considerations
of gender difference, are distorted and inadequate. Neither Daedalus nor
Icarus, cultural god nor his victim son, Woolf and Richardson were free
to rewrite the past, in "women's sentences" (A Room of One's Own),
as a different history of women, and Stein, writing in "a little language
such as lovers use" (The Waves), more or less to abolish it altogether.
Works
Cited
DeKoven, Marianne.
"Breaking the Rigid Form of the Noun: Stein, Pound, Whitman, and Modernist
Poetry," in Critical Essays on American Modernism, eds. Michael
J. Hoffman and Patrick Murphy. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1991.
A Different
Language: Gertrude Stein's Experimental Writing. Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
"Gertrude
Stein and the Modernist Canon," in Gertrude Stein and the Making
of American Literature, eds. Shirley Neuman and Ira Nadel. London:
Macmillan; Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988, 8-20.
"Half
In and Half Out of Doors: Gertrude Stein and Literary Tradition,"
in A Gertrude Stein Companion: Content With the Example, ed.
Bruce Kellner. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, 75-83.
Jameson, Fredric.
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham:
Duke University Press, 1991.
Joyce, James. Finnegans
Wake. New York: The Viking Press, 1939.
Ulysses.
New York: Vintage, 1961.
Perloff,
Marjorie. The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant-Guerre, and the
Language of Rupture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
The
Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981.
Richardson, Dorothy.
Pilgrimage.
Stein, Gertrude.
The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. New York: Random
House, 1933.
"Composition
as Explanation," in Selected Writings of Gertrude Stein, ed. Carl
Van Vechten.
New York: Random House, 1946, 513-23.
Fernhurst,
Q.E.D. and Other Early Writings. New York: Liveright, 1971.
A Geographical
History of America, or the Relationship of Human Nature to the Human
Mind.
Lectures
in America. New York: Random House, 1935.
A Long
Gay Book, in Matisse, Picasso and Gertrude Stein with Two Shorter
Stories. Barton, Something Else Press, Inc., 1972, 11-116.
The Making
of Americans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1934.
Many
Many Women, in Matisse, Picasso and Gertrude Stein with Two
Shorter Stories, 119- 98.
Matisse,
Picasso and Gertrude Stein (G.M.P.), in Matisse, Picasso
and Gertrude Stein with Two Shorter Stories, 202-78.
Narration.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
A Novel
of Thank You. New Haven: Yale University Press,
"Portraits
and Repetition," in Lectures in America, 165-206.
Tender
Buttons, in Selected Writings of Gertrude Stein, 461-509.
Three Lives.
New York: Random House, 1936.
"A Transatlantic
Interview," 1946, in A Primer for the Gradual Understanding of
Gertrude Stein, ed. Robert Bartlett Haas. Los Angeles: Black Sparrow
Press, 1971, 11-35; rpt. in The Gender of Modernism, ed. Bonnie
Kime Scott, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Woolf, Virginia.
Mrs. Dalloway. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1925.
A Room
of One's Own. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1929.
The Waves.
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1931.
Authors
note: This essay first appeared in Studies in the Literary Imagination,
Vol. XXV, Number 2, Fall 1992 and is reprinted with their permission.
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